Cartel Cases: From State Negligence to Direct Political Interest in Hungary
Cartel Cases: From State Negligence to Direct Political Interest in Hungary
This essay elucidates the characteristics of cartels as a type of corporate crime in Hungary and consider the implications of such corporate crimes for the European region. To this end, the essay analyses cartel cases from the Hungarian Competition Authority to answer the following core question: what is the role of the state in responding to cartel cases and in ensuring the freedom of competition in the market? The analysis reveals that the state has different approaches to dealing with corporate crime, like cartels. In some cases, the state itself initiates the cartel (see the watermelon case below), in other incidents, the state facilitates the process (see the cash register case below). In these terms, the conceptual framework of state-corporate crime is used to interrogate the Hungarian context.
Keywords: Corporate Crime, Cartels, State-corporate crime, Hungary, Europe
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