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Philosophical Criminology$
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Andrew Millie

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9781447323709

Published to Policy Press Scholarship Online: May 2017

DOI: 10.1332/policypress/9781447323709.001.0001

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Value judgements

Value judgements

Chapter:
(p.15) Two Value judgements
Source:
Philosophical Criminology
Author(s):

Andrew Millie

Publisher:
Policy Press
DOI:10.1332/policypress/9781447323709.003.0002

This chapter highlights that values are central to criminological concerns in two key ways. Firstly, that value-neutral research is not possible and secondly, that value judgements are integral to understandings of good and bad, and why some actions are tolerated, whilst others are not. This chapter argues that there are some universal moral values (that some things are just always wrong), which should be applied to all contexts regardless of cultural specific laws and customs. However, it is important to consider whose values take precedence within any given society. For example, Politicians have power to dictate or impose certain values to the rest of society. Furthermore, the four different kinds of value judgements (Moral, Aesthetic, Prudential and Economic) are listed and explained. These values are important to consider within criminology as they have an impact on the processes which define certain acts or omissions as criminal.

Keywords:   research, values, criminal, moral judgements, aesthetic judgements, prudential judgements, economic judgements

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